Tryag File Manager - Edit By Mr.SaHr

//usr/share/doc/audit-2.8.5/rules/30-pci-dss-v31.rules

## The purpose of these rules is to meet the pci-dss v3.1 auditing requirements
## These rules depends on having 10-base-config.rules & 99-finalize.rules
## installed.

## NOTE:
## 1) if this is being used on a 32 bit machine, comment out the b64 lines
## 2) These rules assume that login under the root account is not allowed.
## 3) It is also assumed that 1000 represents the first usable user account. To
##    be sure, look at UID_MIN in /etc/login.defs.
## 4) If these rules generate too much spurious data for your tastes, limit the
## the syscall file rules with a directory, like -F dir=/etc
## 5) You can search for the results on the key fields in the rules
##

## 10.1 Implement audit trails to link all access to individual user.
##  This requirement is implicitly met

## 10.2.1 Implement audit trails to detect user accesses to cardholder data
## This would require a watch on the database that excludes the daemon's
## access. This rule is commented out due to needing a path name
#-a always,exit -F path=path-to-db -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F uid!=daemon-acct -F perm=r -F key=10.2.1-cardholder-access

## 10.2.2 Log administrative action. To meet this, you need to enable tty
## logging. The pam config below should be placed into su and sudo pam stacks.
## session   required pam_tty_audit.so disable=* enable=root

## 10.2.3 Access to all audit trails.
-a always,exit -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=10.2.3-access-audit-trail
-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/ausearch -F perm=x -F key=10.2.3-access-audit-trail
-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/aureport -F perm=x -F key=10.2.3-access-audit-trail
-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/aulast -F perm=x -F key=10.2.3-access-audit-trail
-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/aulastlogin -F perm=x -F key=10.2.3-access-audit-trail
-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/auvirt -F perm=x -F key=10.2.3-access-audit-trail

## 10.2.4 Invalid logical access attempts. This is naturally met by pam. You
## can find these events with: ausearch --start today -m user_login -sv no -i

## 10.2.5.a Use of I&A mechanisms is logged. Pam naturally handles this.
## you can find the events with:
##   ausearch --start today -m user_auth,user_chauthtok -i

## 10.2.5.b All elevation of privileges is logged
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setuid -F a0=0 -F exe=/usr/bin/su -F key=10.2.5.b-elevated-privs-session
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setuid -F a0=0 -F exe=/usr/bin/su -F key=10.2.5.b-elevated-privs-session
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setresuid -F a0=0 -F exe=/usr/bin/sudo -F key=10.2.5.b-elevated-privs-session
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setresuid -F a0=0 -F exe=/usr/bin/sudo -F key=10.2.5.b-elevated-privs-session
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -C uid!=euid -F euid=0 -F key=10.2.5.b-elevated-privs-setuid
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -C uid!=euid -F euid=0 -F key=10.2.5.b-elevated-privs-setuid

## 10.2.5.c All changes, additions, or deletions to any account are logged
## This is implicitly covered by shadow-utils. We will place some rules
## in case someone tries to hand edit the trusted databases
-a always,exit -F path=/etc/group -F perm=wa -F key=10.2.5.c-accounts
-a always,exit -F path=/etc/passwd -F perm=wa -F key=10.2.5.c-accounts
-a always,exit -F path=/etc/gshadow -F perm=wa -F key=10.2.5.c-accounts
-a always,exit -F path=/etc/shadow -F perm=wa -F key=10.2.5.c-accounts
-a always,exit -F path=/etc/security/opasswd -F perm=wa -F key=10.2.5.c-accounts

## 10.2.6 Verify the following are logged:
## Initialization of audit logs
## Stopping or pausing of audit logs.
## These are handled implicitly by auditd

## 10.2.7 Creation and deletion of system-level objects
## This requirement seems to be database table related and not audit

## 10.3 Record at least the following audit trail entries
## 10.3.1 through 10.3.6 are implicitly met by the audit system.

## 10.4.2b Time data is protected.
## We will place rules to check time synchronization
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S adjtimex,settimeofday,stime -F key=10.4.2b-time-change
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex,settimeofday -F key=10.4.2b-time-change
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -F key=10.4.2b-time-change
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -F key=10.4.2b-time-change
# Introduced in 2.6.39, commented out because it can make false positives
#-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S clock_adjtime -F key=10.4.2b-time-change
#-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S clock_adjtime -F key=10.4.2b-time-change
-w /etc/localtime -p wa -k 10.4.2b-time-change

## 10.5 Secure audit trails so they cannot be altered
## The audit system protects audit logs by virtue of being the root user.
## That means that no normal user can tamper with the audit trail. If for
## some reason you suspect that admins may be malicious or that their acct
## could be compromised, then enable the remote logging plugin and get the
## logs off the system to assure that there is an unaltered copy.

## 10.5.1 Limit viewing of audit trails to those with a job-related need.
## The audit daemon by default limits viewing of the auit trail to root.
## If someone that is not an admin has a job related need to see logs, then
## create a unique group for people with this need and set the log_group 
## configuration item in auditd.conf

## 10.5.2 Protect audit trail files from unauthorized modifications.
## See discussion in 10.5 above

## 10.5.3 Promptly back up audit trail files to a centralized log server
## See discussion in 10.5 above

## 10.5.4 Write logs for external-facing technologies onto a secure,
## centralized, internal log serve
## See discussion in 10.5 above

## 10.5.5 Use file-integrity monitoring or change-detection software on logs
-a always,exit -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=wa -F key=10.5.5-modification-audit

## Feel free to add watches on other critical logs
# -a always,exit -F path=path-to-log -F perm=wa -F key=10.5.5-modification-log